The agreement offers the possibility of establishing institutional mechanisms and local structures with the capacity for integration, active participation and social cohesion, not only to achieve peace, but also to strengthen national unity. These include regional and local peace and reconciliation structures, a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme (GDR), decentralization measures and the implementation of community policing to build trust between communities and security actors. However, five years after the signing of the agreement, the parties have still sufficiently exploited the opportunity to advance the implementation of these mechanisms. The timetable included the implementation of ceasefire provisions, the formation of a transitional government and a new transitional government with the CNDD-FDD. The establishment of a transitional national assembly, the sending of AMIB and UN peacekeeping forces took place on time. Other provisions, such as the rehabilitation of displaced persons and refugees, the introduction of the CT and judicial reforms, could not be sought as quickly as in the Arusha agreement. The agreement provided for the creation of a technical committee composed of representatives of the Burundian armed forces, fighters from political parties and political movements and external military advisers. The transitional government was tasked with determining the size of the national defence forces, in consultation with the technical committee. According to the agreement, political, ethnic, regional and gender-based criteria would be used to determine defence force imbalances, but the new force would consist of 60% government army officers and 40% of the FDD. But the new force would represent no more than 50% of one of the ethnic groups.1 The reality is that the Malian president must resolutely and publicly commit to supporting the most sensitive provisions of the agreement – in particular the transfer of resources and powers in terms of regionalization and reconstruction of the army. Until it does, the lack of willingness of the parties to implement the agreement will prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. The current situation is therefore based on a precarious balance and cannot be described as a sustainable solution; An outbreak of violence in the medium term cannot be ruled out. The peace process must make considerable progress so as not to become an empty shell that the signatories will eventually abandon in order to resume their hawkish positions.

Not all major parties to the conflict signed the agreement until 2003. During this three-year gap, implementation of civil administration reforms began. The agreement called for reforms aimed at depoliticising the civil service, reducing corruption and increasing skills. In 2001, the government conducted a census of public servants across the country. In the February 2002 result, 40,642 people were employed in the public service, but the Department of Public Service had sent pay cheques to 41,642 people. Some 1,000 people who had been paid were not taken into account.1 In July 2002, Parliament passed a new law that allows unions to work for public servants.2 No initiative has been taken to achieve a balance between ethnic groups in the public service. Despite the creation of the CNRS, the land issue was not prioritized, hampering the peace process.